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Rejoinder to Professor Gold
by Joel B. Dirlam and Hans Mueller
Professor Gold scarcely mentions, much less attempts to refute, our
major point: by use of the protectionist devices of the VRA, the TPM,
and recourse to the ITC, the major integrated U.S. steel producers have
not only retarded their own competitive adjustments, but have gravely
handicapped their steel-using customers. We are unable to find any indi-
cation that Professor Gold has considered the economics of determining
an optimum size for the U.S. steel industry. Throughout his discussion,
his overriding consideration is the welfare of the integrated steel produc-
ers, not the U.S. economy. Echoing the views of spokesmen for the steel
industry, he identifies predatory competition with pricing "below cost"
(Gold, at 4 and 6), and he would "discourage" imports except at periods
when domestic capacity is insufficient to satisfy demand (Gold, at 8). Pro-
fessor Gold's program intensifies the stagflation problem, and will not, in
the long run, result in a healthy U.S. steel industry.
Although he fails to join issiie with the main point of our article, we
nevertheless feel obliged to correct the most glaring factual errors in Pro-
fessor Gold's comments. Failure to do so may mislead the less knowledge-
able readers with respect to the validity of our conclusions.
I. IMPORT INJURY, SUBSIDIES, AND PREDATORY COMPETITION
According to Professor Gold, imports from Western Europe are the
major cause of the difficulties of the U.S. steel industry. Yet these im-
ports accounted for only 38 percent of all U.S. steel imports in 1981, and
7.5 percent of total supplies in the U.S. market. The West European
share of total U.S. steel imports has declined steadily from more than
one-half in 1968 to about one-third in the 1980-1981 period., Because to-
tal steel imports moved along a somewhat uneven plateau during this pe-
riod in both volume and share of U.S. consumption-, Western European
steel imports have also declined in absolute terms (i.e., in tonnage). The
long-term trend of the import share of the U.S. steel market has been
almost stationary at a level of about 15.5 percent of domestic consump-
I AISI, Annual Statistical Report, at 46-47 (1968); AISI, Imports of Iron and Steel
Products by Countries of Origin, 1981, released in February 1982.
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tion since 1968.2 Those West European steel industries that have received
substantial amounts of government aid in recent years account for less
than one-third of this total.
3
Professor Gold hypothesizes that "the enormous displacement of do-
mestic workers by the imports . . . might easily account for 75,000 of the
decrease of 167,000 steel workers between 1965 and 1980" (Gold, at 5).
Leaving aside the fact that the industry experienced a boom at the begin-
ning and a recession at the end of the stated period, and that most of the
decline was the result of rising labor productivity,4 let us focus our atten-
tion on the import-employment relationship. In 1980, the United States
imported 5,108 tons more steel than in 1965.5 At the current output rate
of about 300 annual tons of finished steel products per production
worker,6 this means that imports replaced 15,324 workers and not 75,000
workers. However, imports from the European Community, Professor
Gold's chief target, were actually 1,024 tons lower in 1980 than in 1965.
Can we assume that this drop restored more than three thousand steel
workers' jobs?
European steel producers lack market power in both their home mar-
kets and in the U.S. market. Indeed, their predicament is precisely that
they have been unable to cooperate or collude to maintain price stability
in a recession.7 Even the simplest form of oligopolistic collusion, price
leadership (a long-established tradition among the U.S. integrated firms),
would probably have enabled the European steel firms to avoid the fierce
price competition that has prevailed in their markets in the prolonged
recession beginning in 1974.8
If price competition has been troublesome to the Europeans, it has in
2 Calculated from Table 1 supra, original article.
This includes all steel imports from Western Europe minus those from Germany, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. These three industries have received zero or significant
amounts of public financial assitance. For Germany and the Netherlands, see British Iron
and Steel Consumers' Council, Cost Competitiveness in ECSC Steel Industries, The Effects
of Government Policies, (1981), at 5, 8-9. Only very small quantities of steel have been
imported from Switzerland. To the best of our knowledge, none of the 10 small steel firms
operating in that country have been recipients of public financial aid.
4 Between 1965 and 1979, two years in which demand for steel was strong in the United
States, the number of production workers declined by 116,600 in the U.S. steel industry.
This fall in employment occurred due to the fact that industry shipments in 1979 exceeded
those by 1965 by 7.6 million tons. The decline in employment by 50,400 workers from 1979
to 1980 can hardly be attributed to imports, as the latter experienced a drop of over two
million tons during this period (see Tables 1 and 3 supra).
Table 1, supra, original article.
6 According to Table 2, supra, output per worker ranged from 290 annual tons in 1979
to 311 annual tons in 1981, or approximately 300 tons in the 1979-1981 period.
' Klaus Stegemann, Price Competition and Output Adjustment in the European Steel
Market, at 103-113 (1977).
8 ADAMS & MUELLER, supra note 6, at 103-105 in original article.
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recent years also become a problem to the integrated U.S. producers.'
The problem would be far greater if the Japanese-who possess sufficient
unutilized capacity to increase their exports to the United States by a
factor of six-did not exercise restraint by maintaining their prices above
those of most other imports.10
Low-price leaders in the U.S. market have often been the South Afri-
cans, South Koreans, and for some products, Canadian firms as well as
the American minimills." It is questionable that elimination of the Euro-
pean influence would permit the restoration of full-cost pricing, the only
method Professor Gold would accept as fair and nonpredatory. Only a
firm wall of tight quota barriers could achieve that. Unlike Professor
Gold, we have strong misgivings of the consequences of such a solution on
the future vitality of the American steel-consuming sector.
According to Professor Gold, subsidies to European steel producers
account for their willingness and ability to introduce intense price compe-
tition into the U.S. market (Gold, at 7). To the best of our knowledge, the
only systematic attempt that has been undertaken to gather and evaluate
information on financial assistance received by foreign steel industries
was made by the Federal Trade Commission in its steel study of 1977.12
The conclusions of that study showed that, until 1976, public financial
assistance to steel companies in the European Community did not, except
in the case of the British Steel Corporation, reduce the production costs
of recipient companies by a significant margin."3 Subsequently, a collapse
of the price structure in both home and export markets brought many
European steel firms to the brink of bankruptcy. 4 Initially, several gov-
ernments provided aid by writing off past loans and, when this account-
ing maneuver proved inadequate, they made available considerable
amounts of cash and actually took possession of the companies. 15 We did
not, as Professor Gold contends, state ". . . that such subsidies have been
largely devoted to training and relocation purposes" (Gold, at 2). We did
mention various applications of public financial assistance that would not
distort trade patterns, and then stated that whether assistance would en-
9 METAL INTELLIGENCE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, in original article.
10 Kawahito, Japanese Steel in the American Market: Conflict and Causes, 4 WORLD
ECON. 229, 234, 247-248, supra note 14, in original article.
11 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., supra note 46, in original article, at A-38, and Pub. No.
1221, Determination of the Commission in Investigations Nos. 701-TA-6 through 144, 701-
TA-146, and 701-TA-14 (Preliminary) at 111-26, IV-29, and V-25.
1 Supra note 15, in original article, Chapter 6.
"s Supra note 15, in original article, at 369.
14 ADAMS & MUELLER, supra note 6 at 103-105; P. Marcus, supra note 24, in original
article.
"5 British Iron and Steel Consumers Council, op. cit. supra note 3, this rejoinder at 1-
1982
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able a particular firm to sell at lower prices could only be revealed by a
case-by-case study. Professor Gold has not made such a study. Merely
lifting a list of alleged subsidies [as he does in his Appendix A] from
countervailing duty petitions, is not a substitute for informed economic
analysis.
Although Professor Gold admits that Japanese producers are far
more efficient than their U.S. counterparts, he attributes this in part to
active participation by the Japanese government "in enabling its steel
producers to acquire massive investments on patently less than commer-
cial terms . . ." (Gold, at 2). From 1961 through 1975, loans by Japanese
government agencies to steel companies amounted to $334.4 million or 1.5
percent of total investment expenditures made by the Japanese steel in-
dustry during this period."6 This hardly represents a massive scale of
financial assistance.
Subsidization of, or at least unfair favoritism to foreign producers
exists, according to Professor Gold, because they enjoy more favorable
depreciation rules, and less stringent environmental regulations (Gold, at
7). Until the recent change in American tax laws, the depreciation rules
for steel companies in the United States were no more unfavorable than
those in Japan or Germany. Aggregate cost recovery for the first taxable
year was 35 percent of assets in the United States, 31 percent in Japan,
and 25 percent in Germany. For the first three taxable years, allowed cost
recovery was 57 percent, 55 percent, and 58 percent respectively in the
same three countries.1 7 There is no evidence that U.S. anti-polution stan-
dards are higher than those enforced in Japan and in major European
countries.' During most years of the 1970's, the Japanese steel industry's
capital expenditures for environmental control exceeded those of the U.S.
industry.'" Little information seems to be available on such expenditures
by other major steel industries. If Professor Gold has access to relevant
16 FED. BUREAU OF ECON. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 382.
OTA Report 1980, supra note 4, at 59 in original article.
16 Table 4 supra, original article.
For individual years, expenditures for environmental control by the steel industries
of the United States and Japan were as follows (in million dollars and percent of total
investment):
1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970
U.S. $511 $651 $458 $535 $489 $453 $199 $100 $202 $162 $183
Japan $180 $321 $304 $444 $920 $684 $536 $368 $284 $219 $NA
U.S. 15.4% 19.3% 18.0% 19.7% 15.0% 14.3% 12.6% 7.2% 17.2% 11.3% 10.5%
Japan 6.3% 11.5% 10.9% 15.2% 20.6% 18.4% 18.6% 17.3% 13.4% 8.9% NA
Sources: AISI Annual Statistical Report, various years; TeKKO Tokei Yoran, various years.
Total environmental expenditures for the period from 1971-1908 were $3,760 million
dollars for the U.S. industry and $4,280 million for the Japanese industry.
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comparative data, he should cite them to support his statement.
In short, steel importers from West Europe in the U.S. market have
not engaged in predatory competition according to any definition gener-
ally accepted by economists. Even taken as a group, and disregarding
their intensely competitive behavior, West European steel exporters pos-
sess no significant market power in the United States; they are not en-
larging their modest market share, and they can not conceivably raise
their prices to monopolistic levels.
II. COST ESTIMATION AND COST COMPETITIVENESS
Professor Gold alleges that we evaded what he calls "the central is-
sue" of relative efficiency and cost competitiveness of the major steel ex-
porters "by consistently discussing them as a group instead of recognizing
the substantial differences among them" (Gold, at 1). Professor Mueller
has published several cost analyses, 20 in Section V of our paper we com-
pared capital and labor efficiencies, and in our Table-we provided a sur-
vey of comparative technological efficiency. In both cases we gave sepa-
rate estimates for at least two groups of exporters, those from Japan and
those from the European Community.
It is curious that Professor Gold himself, in spite of his "field visits,
discussions and evaluations of relevant data in Western Europe" (Gold,
at 3), failed to draw on his own experience to give us an independent and
enlightening estimate of relative efficiency and cost competitiveness. Pro-
fessor Gold's Tables 1 and 2, reproductions of tables in a statement pre-
pared by Mr. James Collins on behalf of the American Iron and Steel
Institute,21 do not explain how the presumably full "costs" were derived.
Moreover, we are puzzled by the use of 1979-1980 exchange rates, which
result in unusually high European costs. And, although a publication by
Peter Marcus is listed as one source for Table 1, estimates by Marcus and
Kirsis show Japanese costs to be $60.30 and German costs $86.10 lower
than U.S. costs per metric ton shipped.22
20 For comparative cost analyses prepared by Mueller, see in original article, ADAMS &
MUELLER, supra note 6, at 120-21; supra note 38, at 27-28; H. MUELLER & K. KAWAHITO,
supra note 85, ch. 2.
21 Statement submitted by James Collins, to Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, March, 1982.
22 See Marcus & Kirsis, supra note 5, Table 5, original article. Marcus and Kirsis, how-
ever, underestimate the cost differentials. They underestimate labor productivity for both
Japanese and German steel industries, at least when compared with another (and highly
reliable) source, the U.S. Department of Labor. Marcus and Kirsis also underestimate the
capacity-utilization rates of these two industries which, as we understand their method,
would raise their cost estimates. For example, with Japanese shipments in 1981 at 98 million
tons, Marcus and Kirsis assume a utilization rate of 64 percent. This would attribute to the
Japanese industry's finished product capacity of 156 million tons, which is at a minimum 15
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Finally, Mr. Collins adds freight charges and duties to his estimated
production costs for the foreign producers, apparently to make them com-
parable with American costs f.o.b. plant. As we explained in our article,
freight charges to some important regional markets are less for foreign




We regret that Professor Gold, who has close contacts with both do-
mestic and foreign producers, confined himself largely to arguing that for-
eign countries have been more reprehensible in their trade policies than
has the United States. As he knows, the adoption of uneconomic mea-
sures by foreign nations, "at the expense of their taxpayers, cannot justify
the United States in following the same path. It would have been useful if
Professor Gold had extended his horizon to give us at least a sketch of an
international policy for steel that would satisfy welfare tests, while taking
into account the profound structural changes now underway in Europe,
the United States, Japan, and the Third World.
percent higher than the actually attainable output of that industry.
23 See supra note 57, in original article.
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